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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the potential impact on securities settlement systems (SSSs) of a major market
disruption, caused  by  the  default  of  the largest  player.  A  multi-period, multi-security model  with
intraday  credit  is  used  to  simulate  direct  and  second-round  settlement  failures  triggered  by  the
default, as well as the dynamics of settlement failures, arising from a lag in settlement relative to the
date  of  trades.  The  effects  of  the  defaulter's  net  trade  position,  the  numbers  of  securities  and
participants in the market, and participants' trading behavior are also analyzed.
We show that in SSSs- contrary to payment systems- large and persistent settlement failures are
possible even when ample liquidity is provided. Central bank liquidity support to SSSs thus cannot
eliminate settlement failures due to major market disruptions. This is due to the fact that securities
transactions involve a cash leg and a securities leg, and liquidity can affect only the cash side of a
transaction. Whereas a broad program of securities borrowing and lending might help, it is precisely
during periods of market disruption that participants will be least willing to lend securities.
Settlement failures can continue to occur beyond the period corresponding to the lag in settlement.
This  is  due  to  the  fact  that,  upon  observation  of  a  default,  market  participants  must  form
expectations about the impact of the default, and these expectations affect current trading behavior.
If, ex post, fewer of the previous trades settle than expected, new settlement failures will occur. This
result has interesting implications for financial stability. On the one hand, conservative reactions by
market participants to a default - for example by limiting the volume of trades- can result in a more
rapid return of the settlement system to a normal level of efficiency. On the other hand, limitation of
trading by market participants can reduce market liquidity, which may have a negative impact on
financial stability.
JEL-code :  G20, G28.
Keywords:  Securities settlement, liquidity risk, contagion.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005
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1  INTRODUCTION
A  prerequisite  for  the  development  of  a  viable  capital  market  is  a  well  functioning  transactions
infrastructure.  The  settlement  of  securities  transactions  is  an  important  component  of  this
infrastructure, as it determines the legal transfer of the securities that are traded. This infrastructure
must operate in a seamless and integrated manner, in order to minimize the costs and risks for the
end  users  in  the  market  and  to  facilitate  the  allocation  of  capital.  Hence,  securities  settlement
systems (SSSs) are crucial to the financial system and are often supported by the central bank as
lender of last resort.1
Disruptions in the settlement infrastructure can lead to increased transaction costs and to a possible
erosion of market liquidity which, if serious enough, may undermine financial stability. An extreme
example of the potential severity of settlement failures was provided by the September 11 attacks.
Settlement failures in the U.S. Treasury market jumped from $1.7 billion per day in the week ending
September 5 to $190 billion per day in the week ending September 19 (see Fleming and Garbade,
2002). Failures rose initially because of the destruction of communication facilities, but remained
high because the lending and borrowing program was ill-suited to absorb the massive shock.
This paper explores the potential consequences of a market disruption that is less severe than the
Sept. 11 attack but that is nevertheless serious; namely, the default of the largest participant in the
market. This type  of  shock is of  interest  for policy  makers  and SSSs alike. Indeed,  among the
recommendations for securities settlement systems recently set forth by the Committee on Payment
and  Settlement  Systems  and  the  International  Organization  of  Securities  Commissions  is  that
"SSSs that extend intraday credit to participants...should institute risk controls that, at a minimum,
ensure  timely settlement  in  the  event  that  the  participant  with  the  largest  payment  obligation  is
unable  to  settle."  (See  BIS,  2001).  Similar  scenarios  are  also  used  by  SSSs  for  stress  testing
purposes.
Although a number of previous studies have analyzed the impacts of major disruptions to payment
systems and the extent of resulting contagion, very little investigation of disruptions in SSSs has
been  undertaken.  Such  analysis  may  yield  new  insights,  due  to  several  differences  between
securities settlement and payment systems which could potentially lead to important differences in
the impacts of shocks in the two systems.
1  We use the term SSS to refer to all of the participants as well as the financial infrastructure involved in
securities settlement.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 2
A  first  key  difference  between  payment  systems  and  SSSs  is  that  unlike  payments,  securities
transactions involve a securities leg as well as a cash leg. This gives rise in securities settlement to
principal risk, which is the risk that the seller of a security delivers the security but does not receive
cash in return or that the buyer of a security makes the payment but does not receive delivery of the
security. The response to this risk has been to implement delivery-versus-payment (DVP) systems
- by which settlement finality of the securities and cash leg occurs at the same time, and thus
principal risk is eliminated. However,  default by a major  participant  can  still have  an  impact  on
liquidity in the  SSS if unsettled trades of the defaulted participant are deleted from the system,
leaving non-defaulting  participants with unanticipated cash or securities positions.
Yet,  contrary  to  payment  systems,  a  disruption  in  securities  settlement  cannot  be  fully
accommodated by providing liquidity. This is because after the initial default, participants may not
only be short in cash, but also in securities. In order to further eliminate the effects of a settlement
disruption,  it  would  also  be  necessary  to  have  a  broad,  well  functioning  program  of  securities
borrowing and lending. Yet, it is precisely during crisis periods that uncertainty about repayment is
greatest and holders of securities  will be the least willing to lend. As we discuss below, central
banks may be able to take some measures to help resolve the shortage of securities; however,
these policies have their limits, especially in the case of SSSs that settle non-treasury securities.
A second difference between SSSs and payment systems is the presence of a settlement lag in
SSSs. For example, settlement at time t+2 implies that the settlement of trades takes place two
days  after  the  trades  have  occurred.  Although  this  lag  gives  participants  extra  time  to  find  the
necessary  funds  to  finance  the  trades,  it  also  increases  replacement  cost  risk. 2  In  the  delay
between trade and settlement, asset prices may have changed, making it possibly more expensive
to trade the securities elsewhere if the initial trade does not settle.
More important for this paper, the existence of a settlement lag suggests that a disruption in the
settlement system may have impacts lasting longer than a single day. Indeed, the direct effect of a
default by a major participant will continue to be observed for the number of days corresponding to
the lag in settlement. In addition, the total disruption - which includes the indirect, or contagion,
effects of default- may last even longer than the period of the lag. The reason is that although
participants are assumed to know their counterparties and, thus, can calculate the direct effect of
default, participants do not know the counterparties of their counterparties and cannot know which
of the nondefaulting counterparties traded with the defaulting participant and thus will be unable to
settle  another  trade  as  a  consequence.  Participants  must  form  expectations  about  the  indirect
effects  of  default,  and  these  expectations  determine  the  quantities  of  securities  and  cash  upon
2  Replacement cost risk is the risk that a counterparty may default prior to settlement, denying the non-
defaulting party the gain on the transaction (BIS, 1992).NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 3
which they base their trades after the default. If, ex post, actual settlement failures due to the default
turn out to be higher than participants had expected, then additional settlement failures may occur.
The differences in payment and settlement systems give rise to a number of important questions for
SSSs  which  have  not  been  addressed  by  existing  literature.  What  are  the  dynamic  effects  on
settlement - both direct and contagion effects- of a major disruption in the market? Is the first-day
impact greater or smaller than the impact in subsequent days? How many days does it take for
settlement efficiency (the percentage of trades settled) to return to its normal level? How does the
existence of a cash leg and a securities leg influence the degree of contagion, relative to a payment
system where only cash is involved? Can central bank support of the SSS through credit provision
prevent contagion? If so, how much credit would be needed? How does the trade position of the
defaulter (e.g., size, net buyer versus net seller) affect the magnitude of the disruption?
This paper uses a simulation to address these questions. Settlement is assumed to occur in a DVP
system with gross (trade-by-trade) settlement and with a two-day lag. The SSS may provide liquidity
in  the  form  of  credit,  and  results  are  compared  across  scenarios  with  differing  assumptions
regarding the amount of liquidity provided. Default by the largest player triggers the initial settlement
failures. The direct and contagion effects of the default are measured over a period of ten days
following the default. The impact of the defaulter's net trade position, as well as the numbers of
securities and participants in the market, and participants' trading behavior (moderate versus more
extreme) are analyzed.
Several results emerge from the analysis. First, the two-day lag in settlement implies that settlement
failures will last for at least two days following default. Settlement efficiency is in fact lower on the
day following default than on the day that default occurs, due to continuing contagion. 3 Thus, the
crisis situation initially worsens before improving. Interestingly, settlement efficiency may not return
to normal after two days (and indeed does not return to normal in the simulations reported here),
despite the  two-day settlement lag. The reason is that,  as  noted above,  upon  observation of  a
default on dayt, market participants must form expectations about the impact that the default will
have  on  their  unsettled  trades.  If,  ex  post,  fewer  of  the  unsettled  trades  actually  settle  than
anticipated, then participants may commit to trades in the two days following the default that later
turn out to be infeasible.
This  result  has  interesting  implications  for  financial  stability.  On  the  one  hand,  conservative
reactions by market participants to a default - for example by limiting the volume of trades - will
result in a more rapid return of the SSS to a normal level of efficiency, and an end to the crisis. On
3  Default during day t, prior to settlement on that day, implies that the trades from day t-2 are the first to be
affected, as these trades are settled at the end of day t. Settlement on the day following default concerns
trades that occurred on day t-1.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 4
the other hand, limitation of trading by market participants can reduce market liquidity, which may
have a significant, negative impact on financial stability. In addition, limitation of trading can have
negative welfare effects on participants, due to lost benefits from trading.
A second result  is that the  net trade  position of  the  defaulting institution can  have  a significant
impact on the severity of the crisis. When the SSS provides little or no liquidity, a large net buy
position of the defaulter will cause a significantly higher fall in settlement efficiency than will a large
net sell position. Generous liquidity provision by the SSS can eliminate the differential effects of the
defaulter's trade position  on settlement efficiency; however, liquidity provision cannot completely
eliminate settlement failures: settlement efficiency still falls significantly following the default of the
largest player even when plenty of liquidity is available. 4 As suggested above, this is due to the fact
that  liquidity  provision  by  a  central  bank  or  a  central  security  depository  (CSD)  can  eliminate
problems on the cash side of transactions but not on the securities side. Thus, default by a major
player can still have an impact on the system.
Additional results concern the implications of differing numbers of participants and differences in
trading  behavior.  Not  surprisingly,  the  severity  of  the  crisis  (in  terms  of  settlement  inefficiency)
decreases as the number of participants increases. The size of the largest participant relative to the
market (or  the degree of  concentration) is linked to  the number of  participants; hence,  a larger
number of participants translates into a smaller direct impact of default by the largest player. In
contrast, the severity of the crisis increases with aggregate trading volume. The crisis is also more
severe when participants' trading behavior causes them to trade closer to the boundaries of their
budget constraints (more "extreme" trades) than when their trades are more "moderate".
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  the  existing  literature.  Section  3  presents  a
stylized example of securities trading, which illustrates some of the main ideas and effects of the
simulation model. Section 4 presents the model used for the simulations. Section 5 discusses the
simulation results. Section 6 concludes.
2  LITERATURE REVIEW
Contagion has become a topic much investigated in the finance literature during the last decade.
Starting with bank runs as a channel of financial contagion  when agents do not have complete
information (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), authors have shown that even under perfect information
financial contagion is possible  (see,  e.g.,  Rochet and Tirole (1996),  Allen  and Gale (2000) and
Diamond  and  Rajan  (2003)).  These  papers  concentrate  on  contagion  in  the  interbank  market,
where it is assumed that banks have uncollateralized exposures to each other, and the default of
4  Indeed, the impact of additional liquidity provision above some threshold appears to be limited.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 5
one bank can cause other banks to become insolvent and to default as well. Hence, credit risk and
solvency risk are at the fore.
This is also the idea behind several empirical studies investigating financial contagion. Humphrey
(1986), Angilini, Maresca and Russo (1996) and Norhtcott (2002)) all use payments data from a
single  day  in  payments  systems  in  which  net  settlement  occurs.  Humphrey  uses  data  from  a
randomly selected business day in CHIPS (U.S.) and simulates the impact of a major participant's
failure  by  unwinding  all  of  the  day's  transactions  to  and  from  that  participant,  calculating  the
balances of the remaining participants, comparing this with their capital buffers, and iterating the
unwind. Humphrey finds that on average, 37% of the institutions fail after the initial participant's
failure.  Angilini,  Maresca,  and  Russo  (1996)  and  Northcott  (2002)  use  a  similar method  for  the
Italian  and  Canadian  netting  systems,  respectively,  and  conclude  that  systemic  risk  in  those
systems is very low or nonexistent.
Other empirical studies use data on interbank exposures as reported in banks' balance sheets (see
Upper and Worms (2002), Furfine (2003), and Degryse and Nguyen (2004)). On average, these
papers  also  find  low  degrees  of  potential  contagion.  In  reaction  to  these  findings,  however,
Cifuentes, Ferruci, and Shin (2004) argue that in reality systemic risk may be significantly greater
than that identified by the interbank contagion simulations, because market risk may materialize in
addition to the credit risk. That is, if following a default by an interbank borrower, bank creditors
must liquidate collateral in order to meet their own interbank obligations, then asset prices may fall,
thereby lowering banks' values even further and possibly generating new defaults. Cifuentes et al
illustrate the potential impact of market risk via simulations where bank assets are marked to market
and banks' sales of illiquid assets in response to defaults by interbank borrowers are assumed to
cause a fall in the market prices of these assets.
The small degree  of  interbank contagion  found empirically,  together  with the virtual absence of
principal risk (or credit risk) in SSSs may explain why there are very few studies on systemic risk in
securities settlement systems. Indeed, De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) observe in their extensive
literature review on systemic risk that: "Empirical studies of systemic risk in securities settlement
systems appear to be non-existent". However, as noted in the Introduction, liquidity risk is important
in SSSs and may have systemic consequences.5
5  It  is  possible  that  the  liquidity  risk  arising  from  disruptions  in  SSSs  can  also  lead  to  market  risk,  if
participants liquidate collateral in response to cash shortages arising from settlement failures. However, the
consequences of such market risk would be, as in the model of Cifuentes et al, to lower participants' equity
values and possibly to cause insolvencies. Whereas defaults due to a fall in asset prices would lead to
additional liquidity risk for the nondefaulting participants, there is no direct feedback mechanism from the
market risk to liquidity risk.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 6
The  nature  of  systemic  risk  in  SSSs,  however,  seems  to  depend  somewhat  upon  the  type  of
settlement system: net or gross settlement. In net settlement systems, transactions are settled on a
net basis, which economizes on the amount of liquidity needed by participants. However, default by
a participant in a net settlement system causes costly trade unwinds, whereby some or all of the
transfers  involving  that  participant  are  deleted  and  the  settlement  obligations  of  the  other
participants  are  recalculated,  which  may  lead  to  possible  further  unwinds.  This  increases
replacement cost risk, as settlement is only final at the end of the entire settlement process.
Gross settlement systems, on the other hand, transfer instructions for both securities and funds on
a trade-by-trade basis during the settlement process. Failure of a participant to meet a delivery or
payment obligation on a given transaction will not lead to costly unwinds of multiple transactions.
Yet,  DVP  systems  with gross  settlement  require  substantial  intraday  liquidity.  If  participants  are
unable to adjust their cash balances during the processing cycle, they will have to hold enough cash
to cover at least the largest debit position during processing. Hence, liquidity risk becomes more
important than with net settlement systems. If sufficient money balances are not available, high “ fail”
rates may result, implying substantial liquidity risk and replacement cost risk to counterparties.
Most of the literature on payments settlement has focused on the differential effects of gross versus
net settlement.  Angilini (1998) uses a real-time gross settlement model (RTGS) to show that if
daylight liquidity is costly, banks may be induced to postpone payment, hence increasing liquidity
risk in the system. On the other hand, Kahn and Roberds (1998) note that although net settlement
is less costly due to the lower need for liquidity, net settlement increases moral hazard, as banks
have an option to revoke their trades, which distorts incentives. Kahn, McAndrews and Roberds
(2003)  analyze  more  fully  the  prospect  of  strategic  default  in  settlement  systems  and  end  up
concluding that net settlement causes less payment gridlock. Leinonen and Soramaki (1999) use
Finnish  data  to  quantify  the  relationship  between  liquidity  usage  and  settlement  delay  in  net
settlement systems and in RTGS systems with queuing of unsettled trades. When the central bank
provides  low-cost  intraday  credit,  liquidity  costs  are  low  relative  to  delay  costs;  hence,  RTGS
systems with queuing are more efficient.
The  main  conclusion  from  this  line  of  research  appears  to  be  that  there  is  no  liquidity  risk  in
payment systems using gross settlement as long as there is sufficient and cheap intraday credit.
However, for the reasons noted in the Introduction (e.g., securities and cash leg, settlement lags),
this argument will not necessarily hold for SSSs. The only paper to our knowledge that investigates
liquidity risk in SSSs is that of Iori (2004), which analyzes the importance of operational risk with
respect  to  differing  lag  times  between  trade  and  settlement  in  both  gross  and  net  settlement
systems. In this model, only one security is traded, and no cash or budget constraints exist for the
participants  in  the  system.  Trades  occur  at  periodic  intervals,  and  operational  delays  result  in
settlement  failures  whenever  the  operational  delay  is  longer  than  the  lag  between  trade  and
settlement. While shortening the lag between trade and settlement has the advantage of reducingNBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 7
replacement cost following the failure of a participant to settle, it also increases the likelihood of
settlement failures caused by an operational problem. Thus, even under real-time settlement (t+0),
significant settlement contagion is still possible.
Much of the empirical literature on contagion in payments systems and interbank markets makes
use of simulations with strong underlying assumptions, which are necessary because of the inability
to obtain data on participants' bilateral positions. This will be all the more true for simulations of
SSSs, which generally will not be able to make use of any real data. Not only are data relating to
individual trades in SSSs highly confidential, but also the amount of data needed for an empirical
study would be massive, due to the need to have data on participants' cash and securities holdings
as well as their trades.  Only the SSSs themselves are able to use real data in simulations or stress
tests. Unfortunately, such exercises are for internal use only and often suffer from a number of
shortcomings when viewed from a financial stability perspective. First, SSSs are mainly concerned
about their own exposure in case the largest participant fails. Second, stress tests often take into
account  only  the  direct  effects  of  a  participant's  failure,  which  underestimates  systemic  risk.
Moreover, when contagion, or second-round, effects are incorporated, they only cover a single day
of trade data, while disruptions in the settlement system may last for several days. Finally, trading
behavior in times of stress likely differs signficiantly from behavior on "normal" days, raising the
question as to whether the use of trading data from a "normal" day is valid for simulating a stress
event. The only apparent way around this problem is to conduct empirical studies based upon real
stress events, as in Flemming and Garbade (2002). (Un)fortunately, these events are rare.
3  STYLISED EXAMPLE
This section presents a stylized example of securities trading, which illustrates settlement with a
DVP  system,  the  effect  of  a  settlement  lag,  and  the  liquidity  risk  arising  from  the  default  of  a
participant.  The  example  is  one  where  a  single  security  is  traded  and  where  there  are  four
participants (W, X, Y, and Z) in the system.  Settlement occurs with a two-day lag. Trades from day
D are assumed to be settled at the end of day D+2 (after trading on day D+2 has already occurred).
The diagram below depicts both trading and settlement. Day D corresponds to the day on which
Participant W is assumed to default. The diagram illustrates trading between all of the participants
from day D-2 through day D+1 and settlement of trades on day D through day D+3 (the two-day lag
implies that trades from day D-2 will not be settled until day D).
The left  panel for each  day relates to trading and  displays  in  parentheses the quantities  of  the
security and cash, respectively, that each participant expects to have after incorporating past tradesNBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 8
into  initial  endowments. 6  Trades  are  represented  by  arrows,  where  the  direction  of  the  arrow
indicates who is selling the security to whom, and the number without parentheses next to each
arrow represents the quantity of the security traded. The number in parentheses next to each arrow
represents  the  order  in  which  the  trades  occur.  All  securities  prices  are  assumed  equal  to  1;
therefore, a sale of 30 securities by W to X (the first trade on day D-2) will also involve a payment of
30  in  cash  by  X  to  W.  Trades  are  constrained  to  be  feasible  given  the  participants'  expected
holdings of securities and cash, and no short selling or credit is allowed. Participants' expected
holdings of the security and cash are updated after each trade and used to determine the feasibility
of the subsequent trade.
The right panel for each day relates to settlement, with participants' actual holdings of the security
and cash just prior to the beginning of the settlement process (and used for settlement) given in
parentheses for each participant. Trades cannot be partially settled; i.e., either the entire trade is
settled or no quantities are exchanged. Trades settle when both participants hold in their accounts
the necessary quantities of the security or cash required by the trade. If one of the participants is
short, the trade does not settle (DVP system).  Gross settlement is used in the example; therefore,
netting (i.e. offsetting buy and sell positions) is not allowed.  Trades that settle are represented by a
solid arrow. Trades that do not settle are represented by a dashed arrow. Settlement of trades is
attempted in the order in which the trades occurred (which maximizes settlement efficiency).
Panel a of the diagram (day D-2) gives the initial endowments of the security and cash for each
participant. For example, X starts with 100 units of the security  and 50 cash. In the first trade, W
sells 30 of the security to X, who now expects to have 130 of the security and 20 cash. This allows
X to sell 110 of the security to Y in the second trade. No settlement occurs on day D-2 because of
the two-day settlement lag.
On the next day (day D-1), participants' expected holdings of the security and cash incorporate all of
the trades from the previous day (panel b). For instance, participant X  now expects to have 60 of
the  security  (100+30-110+40  =  60)  and  90  in  cash  (50-30+110-40  =  90).  In  this  example,  W
engages in no trading on day D-1.7
We  assume  that  at  the  beginning  of  day  D,  and  before  any  trading  has  begun,  participant  W
defaults. All other participants know that all unsettled trades with W will be deleted from the system.
They must, therefore, adjust their expected quantities of the security and cash accordingly. This is
the direct effect of the default. For example, participant X knows that it will not receive 30 of the
6  The quantities of the security and cash given for each participant on day D-2 can be taken as the initial
endowments.
7  We make this assumption only to keep the example as simple as possible.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 9
security from W. Consequently, X now has 30 less of the security and 30 more in cash than it would
have expected to have if the default by W had not occurred.
As mentioned above, whereas we assume that participants know the counterparties of their trades,
they are not assumed to know the quantities of the security and cash held by their counterparties,
nor  the  trades  of  their  counterparties  with  other  counterparties.  Hence,  participants  cannot
anticipate which of their previous trades with nondefaulting counterparties will not settle due to the
impact of W's default on those counterparties. In other words, participants do not know the indirect
effects of the default. As a consequence, they must form some expectations about these effects. To
keep this example as simple as possible, we make the (unrealistic) assumption that participants
expect the indirect effects of default to be zero; that is, they expect all trades with nondefaulting
counterparties to  settle. 8 For  example,  Y's  expected  holdings,  which  will serve  as  the  basis  for
trading on day D (panel c), become 10 of the security (95-90+5 = 10) and 160 in cash (75+90-5 =
160).
At the end of day D, trades from day D-2 are presented for settlement. Panel d shows that trades
from W have been deleted from the system (hence there is no arrow corresponding to the trade
between W and X on day D-2). Because this trade has been deleted (and X does not receive the 30
in securities from W), the trade between X and Y (and indeed, each subsequent trade) does not
settle (dashed arrows). These are the indirect effects of the default. X, Y and Z are all securities-
constrained as a result. These unsettled trades are put in the queue of unsettled trades and will be
presented again for settlement on Day D+1.
At  the  start  of  day  D+1,  participants  use  the  results  from  the  previous  day's  settlement  (which
determined the actual holdings of the security and cash that participants have in their accounts),
and they then incorporate into these holdings their expected holdings following the trades from day
D-1  and  day  D,  which  have  not  yet  settled. 9  So,  X's  expected  holding  of  the  security  is  150
(100+90-60+20 = 150) and 0 in cash (50-90+60-20 = 0). After trading (panel e), settlement of day
D-1 trades (and the trades in the queue) commences (panel f). Only one transaction can be settled
(solid arrow). For all other trades participants are either cash or securities-constrained.
To keep the example as simple as possible, we assume no further trading after day D+1; however,
we examine the results of settlement of all trades which are still unsettled. Trades from day D will be
presented for settlement on day D+2 (panel g). Note that the actual holdings of securities and cash,
which are used for settlement, differ from the expected holdings on which the trades from day D
were based. For example, at the time of trading on day D, X expected to have (120, 30), while the
8  We adopt a richer assumption on expectations in the model used for our simulations.
9  We assume that participants disregard trades that are already in the queue of unsettled trades. This is due
in part to the fact that participants do not know when and if these trades will settle.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 10
actual  holdings  for  settlement  of  these  trades  are  (100,  50).    This  difference  results  in  the
persistence of unsettled trades. Only four trades settle on day D+2; three remain unsettled. After
settlement, X ends up with 50 of the security (100+20-110+40 = 50).
In this example, it takes until day D+3 before all trades settle. Due to the initial default, settlement
efficiency  has  remained  below  100%  for  three  consecutive  days.  This  is  caused  in  part  by  the
trades that are deleted due to the default (the direct effect) and in part by participants trading on the
basis of expected holdings of securities and cash which, ex post, turn out to differ from their actual
holdings (due to the indirect effects of default). These differences occur whenever some trades
unexpectedly do not settle on the anticipated day.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 11
Trades
(based    on  participants'  expected  holdings  of  cash
and securities)
Settlement
(given the actual holdings of cash and securities in
participants' accounts at time of settlement)
a) Day D-2, trading
b) Day D-1, trading
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e) Day D+1, trading f) Day D+1, settlement of trades from day D-1
Day D+2 g) Day D+2, settlement of trades from day D
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4  MODEL
As  in  the  above  example,  we  model  a  SSS  with  DVP  and  gross  settlement,  where  settlement
occurs  with  a  two-day  lag.  There  are  N  participants  and  K  securities.  All  securities  prices  are
assumed to be fixed and normalized to one. 10 The total quantity of each security is also normalized
to one. In Section 4.1 we describe the main features of the model and underlying intuition. Section
4.2 details the notation and assumptions.
4.1 Description
Initial endowments and  timing of  events. Participants  are  randomly allocated  initial quantities  of
cash and securities. We compare two different allocation schemes (described in Section 4.2) with
differing degrees of concentration, which allows us to investigate the importance of concentration on
the impact of default by the largest participant.
Three "events" occur during each dayt in the following order: (i) participants' determination of their
expected holdings of cash and securities, which will form the "budget constraints" used for trading
on day t; (ii) trading; and (iii) settlement at the end of day t of trades undertaken on day t-2.11
Determination of "expected"  budget constraints. As in the stylized example, because  settlement
occurs  with  a  lag,  the  budget  constraints  that  are  used  for  trading  will  represent  participants'
expected holdings of securities and cash. The expected holdings at the beginning of day t will be
the  amounts  of  securities  and  cash  that  participants  believe  will  actually  be  in  their  accounts
following  settlement  of  the  trades  from  days t-2 and t-1.  We  make  the  distinction  between
participants'  expectations  in  "normal'  times  and  in  "crisis"  times;  i.e.,  after  a  participant  has
defaulted.
Expectations in normal times : We assume that as long as no defaults have occurred, participants
expect that all of their previously committed trades will settle (which will actually turn out to be the
case).  Thus,  participants'  expected  budget  constraints  at  the  beginning  of  day t  (reflecting  the
expected results of settlement of all trades undertaken prior to day t) will be identical to the actual
amounts of securities and cash that will be deposited in their accounts once settlement of all trades
up to dayt has occurred. This means, further, that the amounts of securities and cash actually in
participants' accounts on dayt+2 and used for settlement of day- t trades will be identical to the
10  Allowing for changing securities prices would not affect our qualitative results on settlement failures.
11  In practice, settlement of day t-2 trades will typically begin during the day on day t; however, completion of
the settlement process will generally not occur before the end of the day. For modelling purposes, we
assume that settlement of all day t-2 trades occurs at the end of day t.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 14
amounts that were reflected in the expected budget constraints used for determining day- t trades.
Thus, no settlement failures will occur.
Expectations in crisis times . As in the example of Section 3, when a participant defaults, all of its
unsettled trades are deleted from the system, which leads to the direct effects of the default. As
before, there may also be indirect effects of the default. As is discussed in more detail in the next
subsection, we assume that participants adjust (reduce) their expected holdings of securities and
cash in response to observed settlement failures following the default.
Trading. Trades are assumed to occur randomly. That is, a given security and pair of participants
are randomly selected, then the set of feasible trades of the security between the two participants is
determined via the two participants' expected budget constraints. Once the set of feasible trades
has  been  determined,  a  trade  is  then  randomly  selected  from  this  set.  The  expected  budget
constraints  of  the  participants  are  then  updated  to  reflect  the  trade.   We  compare  results  from
scenarios where trades occur between all possible pairs of participants and securities and where
the quantity of trades is limited.
The assumption of random trade behavior is more realistic than might appear to be the case at first
glance. Large securities firms are often dealers who trade on behalf of their clients. Trades are
executed according to the demands of the clients; therefore, the trades look random from the point
of view of the securities firm.
Settlement. As in the example of Section 3, settlement of trades is assumed to occur in the same
order as the order in which the trades were undertaken, which maximizes settlement efficiency. 12 A
further  aid  to  settlement  is  the  assumption  of  a  queue  of  unsettled  trades,  which  also  reflects
practice in SSS's. The settlement process during a given day is assumed to consist of five batches,
or iterations. If a trade does not settle in the first batch, it is placed in a queue. Subsequently all
other trades are either settled or added to the queue. When all trades have been tried once, the
trades in the queue are presented for settlement in the next batch. This process continues until
either all trades are settled or all five iterations have taken place. 13 Trades that are still unsettled at
the end  of the five batches are placed in the  queue for settlement in the  next day's settlement
process.
Another feature of the model that can reduce settlement failures is the provision of intraday credit,
which may be drawn upon during the settlement process. Note that at the point when trades for day
12  In practice, SSSs do not actually know the order of trades, although they do know the order in which trades
entered into their computer system. They use a number of algorithms to maximise settlement efficiency and
to minimise the amount of liquidity that must be provided.
13  Because trades that are not settled in the first batch often settle in a subsequent batch, allowing for a
queue of unsettled trades reduces the negative impact on settlement of default by a participant.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 15
t are settled (i.e., at the end of day t+2), the holdings of securities and cash that participants have in
their accounts reflects the settlement of all trades that were undertaken up to day t. When intraday
credit is available, a participant who is short in cash for settlement of a trade can draw on the credit
during the settlement process and avoid settlement failure. Simulations with differing amounts of
credit availability are compared in Section 5.
As noted earlier, one of the assumptions underlying the model is that there is no securities lending
and borrowing program. The difficulty of maintaining a well functioning program is alluded to by
Fleming and Garbade (2002). These authors note several potential solutions for helping to resolve a
shortage of securities; however each solution has its limits.  Among the potential solutions are: i)
response by the Treasury to the shortage in the securities lending pool by reopening on-the-run
notes.  ii)  extension  of  central  bank  securities  lending;  and  iii)  an  increase  in  penalty  fees  for
settlement  failures.  However,  the  effectiveness  of  these  solutions  is  limited  by  the  following
considerations:  the  solutions  may  only  solve  settlement  fails  for  particular  securities;  limits  on
lending and borrowing may apply; treasuries will need to be involved; and participants may still be
unwilling to lend securities in stress periods. In fact, the potential role of a central bank in case of
settlement fails may be particularly narrow, especially for the case of SSSs outside the central bank
that  settle  non-treasury  securities.  Such  securities  cannot  be  issued  by  the  treasury  and  are
generally not available in the portfolio of the central bank.
Initial shock. The initial shock in settlement is assumed to stem from an exogenous default of the
largest  participant,  where  size  is  measured  by  the  volume  of  trades. 14  This  does  not  imply,
however, that solvency risk is playing a role in the model. The simulation takes into account liquidity
risk only, gauged in terms of the trades that fail to settle because of insufficient cash or securities
holdings  by  the  transaction  participants.  Unlike  the  interbank  contagion  literature,  participants'
losses due to failed trades are not compared with a solvency constraint.
4.2 Notation and assumptions
The following table presents notation used in the model.
N number of participants
K number of securities, with the quantity of each security normalized to 1. If a participant
holds 0.01 of security k, it holds 1% of the total outstanding amount of this security.
t time index, representing one day.
T(t) Three-dimensional trade flow matrix (N,N,K) of trades occurring during day t, where the
entry Tijk represents the quantity of security k that participant i buys from participant j on
day t. Negative values equal sales by i to j, and T ijk= -T jik. T ijk = 0 when no trade has
14  In our model, the participant with the largest initial endowment of securities and cash ends up being the
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occurred.
S(t) Three-dimensional  settlement  flow  matrix  (N,N,K),  whose  elements  are  defined
analogously to those of T(t-2), which contains all trades from day t-2 to be settled on day
t.15 Unsettled trades enter as zeros in the matrix.
L(t-2)  (N, K+1) matrix containing the legal (or post-settlement) holdings of the K securities and
cash by each participant at the beginning of day t-2, but only known at the beginning of
day t, (or equivalently, after the settlement process at the end of day t-1) . The matrix
reflects the results of all past settlement; i.e. L(t-2) = S(t-1) + S(t-2) + S(t-3)+…
E[L(t)‰L(t-2), T(t-2), T(t-1)]
Expectations of L(t) formed by each participant prior to trading on day t and based upon
information on all previous settled and unsettled trades. Because L(t-2) will already have
been determined by the beginning of day t, E[L(t)] will ultimately differ from L(t) only if
some  of  the  participant's  trades  on  days  t-2  and  t-1  do  not  settle  (which  will  become
known at the end of days t and t+1, respectively).
The figure below depicts the timing of events during a single day t as described in Section 4.1, and
the matrices that are relevant for each event.
Expected holdings E[L(t)] are based upon information available at the beginning of day t, which
includes the history of trades and settlement, as reflected in L(t-2), T(t-2) and T(t-1). Once E[L(t)] is
determined, participants trade, and the trades are recorded in the matrix T(t). After each trade has
been determined, the trading participants' cells in the expected budget constraint matrix E[L(t)] are
updated before a new trade occurs. At the end of the day, trades that were committed on day t-2
are presented for settlement. By comparing T(t-2) with the actual holdings reflected in L(t-2), it is
determined if a particular trade is settled or not. Hence S(t) becomes known.
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4.2.1 Initial securities and cash holdings, L(1)
Securities are initially allocated according to one of two possible allocation schemes: a "diversified"
and a "concentrated" scheme. In the diversified scheme each of the N participants receives the
quantity 1/N of each of the K securities. In the concentrated scheme, the entire quantity of each
security  is  randomly  allocated  to  a  given  participant.  The  diversified  scheme  ensures  that
participants have equal market shares, while the concentrated scheme leads to differing market
shares.  Cash  positions  are  assumed  to  equal  a  fraction  C  <  1  of  the  initial  endowment  of
securities.16 This reflects the idea that cash bears no return and is only held for trading purposes.
Participants can go short in cash during settlement by using credit granted by the CSD. The credit
limit is set as a fractionl   of the initial endowment of assets. The credit in the model can be
thought of as representing either the collateralised credit provided by a CSD or liquidity that may
otherwise  be  available  through  the  interbank  market  (which  is  not  formally  modelled  here).
However, since credit is costly, we assume that participants try not to use it on "normal" days. That
is, participants do not include credit in their expected budget constraints used to determine their
trades. Participants are assumed to make use of their credit line within the SSS only as a backup
facility, that is, during the settlement process to avoid unanticipated settlement failures. 17 Note that
for day 1, E[L(1)] = L(1) by definition.
4.2.2 Expected budget constraints EL(t)
As mentioned in Section  4.1, in normal times participants expect that all trades  will settle. This
implies that in normal times E[L(t)]=L(t-2)+T(t-1)+T(t-2). In crisis times (i.e., after a participant has
defaulted),  participants must adjust their expected  holdings of  securities  and  cash to reflect the
direct and indirect effects of default. Each participant takes account of the direct effects of a default
by adjusting E[L(t)] to reflect the fact that all unsettled trades with the defaulting participant will be
deleted from the settlement system.
With respect to the indirect effects of default, we assume that on a given dayt following a default by
a participant, the nondefaulting participants reduce their expected holdings of securities and cash
by  some  amount t e = ) 1 (
*
1 - - t q g ,  where g £ 0   and
*
1 - t q   is  the  measure  of  indirect  settlement
efficiency  (defined  below)  on  day  t-1.  The  coefficient g   captures  the  degree  of  conservatism  in
participants' expectations. Varying this parameter allows us to compare results when participants
reduce their expected holdings by very small amounts ( g close to zero) or larger amounts ( g ‡ 1).
We report results in Section 5 for scenarios withg =0 and with g=1.
16  Participants who were not endowed with any security receive the quantity C in cash.
17  Allowing participants to draw on their credit lines for trading would not change any of the qualitative results
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While our assumption regarding expectations of the indirect effects of a default is admittedlyad hoc,
it nevertheless provides an element of "endogeneity" in expectations. For example, if, during a crisis
period, participants observe that only 80% of trades settled during the settlement process on day t-
1, they will reduce their expected holdings of securities and cash, used for trading on day t, to 80%
of the holdings they would have had if all of their previous trades would settle (assuming that g=1).18
These expectations, while fairly conservative, may still generate additional settlement failures. To
the extent that,ex post, the percentage of unsettled trades due to the indirect effects of default is
higher than what participants had expected, new settlement failures may occur. This explains in part
why settlement failures continue beyond the period of the lag in settlement.
4.2.3 Determining trades T(t)
As described above, trades are determined by randomly choosing two counterparties and a security
and by random selection of a trade from the set of feasible trades of the security between the two
participants. The expected budget constraint for participant i is given by thei-th row of the matrix
EL(t). The first K columns represent i's expected quantities of each of the K securities, and the
K+1st column represents i's expected holding of cash.  The expected budget constraints of the two
participants are used to determine the set of feasible trades of the security. Thus, the maximum
amount of security k that participant i can purchase from j is given by:
  P = min[EL(t)i,K+1; EL(t)j, k].
The maximum amount of security k that participant i can sell to j is given by:
 S  = min[EL(t)i,k; EL(t)j, K+1].
All feasible trades of securityk between participants i and j can then be represented by the interval
[-S,P], where, by convention, we assign negative values to sales.
The trade, which will be recorded as entry Tijk in the matrix T(t), is randomly chosen from the interval
[-S,P] by use of a symmetrical beta distribution with parameter b > 0. This distribution has the
advantage that varying the parameters of the distribution leads to more or less "extreme" trades;
i.e., how close the trade is to the boundaries of the feasible set of trades and, therefore, of the
participants'  expected  budget  constraints.  As  noted  in  the  Appendix,  the  standard  uniform
distribution is a special case of the beta distribution, where b =1 . Values of 0< b <1 represent
18  We also discuss in Section 5 some simulations where participants have more "conservative" expectations,
whereby they reduce their expected security and cash holdings by even more than the fraction of unsettled
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extreme trading  behavior,  as  trades  frequently  occur near the  boundaries of  the  set  of  feasible
trades. A value of b >1 represents participants with less extreme trading behavior.
After Tijk is chosen, the expected cash and security positions in the participants' rows in the matrix
EL(t)) are updated. Then another security and participant combination is selected.19
To  capture  the  fact  that,  in  reality,  all  participants  do  not  trade  every  security  with  all  potential
counterparties, we run some scenarios where the number of trades is limited below the maximum
possible  number. We limit trades  by  halting  trading  when  the  value of  total  turnover  reaches a
proportion m of the aggregate value of securities and cash holdings in the system. In Section 5 we
compare results for scenarios wherem = 0.1 and 0.5, and where there is no limit (i.e., where trades
occur between all possible combinations of counterparties and securities).
4.2.4 Determining S(t)
S(t) is the matrix containing all settled trades from day t-2, as reflected in the trading matrix T(t-2),
plus any unsettled trades from the queue. Trades do not settle if settlement would imply any one of
the following:
- A counterparty's cash position becomes overdrawn and exceeds the credit limit granted by
the CSD.
- A counterparty becomes short in securities.
- One of the counterparties defaulted prior to settlement
Trades are settled one-by-one (gross settlement) in the same order as they were traded. Each trade
is compared with the holdings of cash and securities represented by the relevant entries in the
matrix L(t-2), plus available credit.
For example, trade T ijk(t-2) will be settled on day t if it lies in the interval [- P S, ], where P  is the
maximum amount of security k that i can purchase from j, taking into account i's credit limit.
P  = min[L(t-2)i,K+1+crediti; L(t-2)j, k]
Similarly, S  is the maximum  amount  of  security k that  player i can sell to  player j,  taking  into
account j's credit limit.
S  = min[L(t-2)i,k; L(t-2)j,K+1+creditj]
19  Our algorithm allows a participant to trade a single security multiple times during a given trading day;
however,    the  participant  is  not  allowed  to  trade  the  same  security  multiple  times  with  the  same
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and k j t L , ) 2 ( -  is the quantity of security k in participant j's account at the beginning of dayt and
1 , ) 2 ( + - K j t L is the amount of cash in j's account at the beginning of day t (idem for i). Credit j, is the
credit of j available from the SSS (idem for i).
Trades that are not settled become zero entries in the S(t) matrix. Trades that do settle are filled in
and L(t-2) is updated. As noted above, unsettled trades are placed in a queue, and either settled in
a subsequent batch during day t or held in the queue for settlement on day t+1. 20 At the end of the
settlement process on day t, the matrix L(t-1) becomes known.
4.2.5 The initial shock
We assume that due to external factors, the largest participant is not able to fulfil its obligations on
day D and subsequent days. We also assume that during day D rumours of the imminent default
begin  circulating  in  the  market,  and  participants  react  by  avoiding  all  trades  on  day  D  with  the
troubled participant. This allows investigation of the impact of a default that is "anticipated" and
which will result in less of a shock than a completely unanticipated default. Actual failure of the
participant  is  assumed  to  occur  at  the  close  of  the  trading  period  on  day  D,  but  before  the
settlement  period  begins.  Hence,  before  the  settlement  process  begins  on  day D,  all  of  the
unsettled trades of the failing participant from day D-2 and D-1 are deleted, and settlement of other
trades  from  D-2  proceeds. Such a procedure  is in  accordance  with reality,  where  a bankruptcy
administrator or liquidator may block all unsettled trades in order to protect the interests of creditors.
4.2.6 Calculation of settlement efficiency and market liquidity
We use  settlement efficiency as  an  aggregate  measure  of  liquidity risk. Settlement efficiency  is
determined  by  dividing  the  aggregate  value  of  settled  trades  by  the  aggregate  value  of  trades
needing to be settled. We distinguish between two measures: total settlement efficiency ( q (t)) and
indirect  settlement  efficiency  ( ) ( * t q ).  In  the  first  measure  the  denominator  includes  all  trades
committed  two  days  earlier,  including  those  involving  the  defaulting  participant. 21  On  the  other
hand, for the measure of indirect settlement efficiency ) ( * t q , the denominator excludes trades
involving the defaulting participant. Hence, indirect settlement efficiency is a measure of contagion
in the settlement system.
20  Note that as in reality, partial settlement , i.e.; splitting a large trade into many small ones which are than
settled separately, is not allowed.   Partial netting of several trades in the same transaction chain is also not
allowed. In practice, SSS may use "back-to-back" netting; however, applying netting to a chain longer than
two  participants  is  often  technically  infeasible,  since  the  number  of  netting  possibilities  increases
exponentially as the chain  lengthens.
21  Plus all the trades that did not settle previously; i.e., the ones in the queue.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 21
From a financial stability perspective, settlement efficiency is not the only potential measure that is
important. Market liquidity matters, too. For example, settlement efficiency may converge very fast
to its pre-default levels, while at the same time trading volume is very low because participants limit
their trades. Hence, we also construct a second indicator of efficiency, which  attempts to measure
the fall in market liquidity as a result of the default. Our measure of market liquidity on day t equals
the value of turnover on dayt as a proportion of the average daily turnover during the ten days prior
to the default. Trades from the defaulting participant are excluded from both the numerator and the
denominator of this measure.
5  SIMULATION RESULTS
5.1 Parameters
Simulations have been undertaken for the following combinations of parameter values:
-  Number of participants: N = 5 or 15;
-  Number of securities: K = 20 or 30;
-  Values of the Beta distribution:b = 0.2 or 1;
-  Multiplier (of prior  indirect  settlement inefficiency)  for the adjustment of  expected holdings of
securities after default): g  = 0 or 1;
-  Availability of credit (as a fraction of value of initial endowments): l  = 0, 0.5 or 1;
-  Amount of cash held, as a proportion of total value of initial endowment of securities: C = 0.05;
-  Limit on total turnover as a proportion of aggregate value of securities and cash: m  = 0.1, 0.5, or
no limit;
-  Allocation of initial endowments: “ diversified”  and “ concentrated”  scheme.
One  thousand  simulations  have  been  run  for  each  combination  of  parameter  values.  Each
simulation runs  for 20 days prior  to a default occurring.  This ensures that trading  behavior  has
“ stabilized”  well before default occurs.  At the end of the 20th day, the largest participants defaults.
The simulation continues for ten days following default.
Although N and K have been set at relatively low levels, these values are in fact more realistic than
may first appear. Whereas the number of securities traded in actual SSSs may be very large, often
only  a  small  number  of  securities  is  actively  traded.  Similarly,  even  when  an  SSS  has  many
participants,  it  is  common  that  only  a  few  active  participants,  such  as  large  custodians,
broker/dealers, central counterparties or specialized traders, account for a majority of the trading. In
addition, many SSSs actually involve only a dozen participants.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 22
5.2 Results
5.2.1  Market shares
Table 1 reports the market share on day D-2 of the largest participant (which will be the defaulting
participant)  for  differing  values  of  N  and  initial  allocation  schemes,  and  for  a  scenario  with  the
following values of other parameters: K=30; m = 0.5;b = 1. Market shares are calculated as the
(absolute value of) total trades of the participant as a proportion of the (absolute value of) total
trades  in  the system on a “ normal”  trading day.  As  expected,  the  average  market  share  of  the
largest  participant  is  higher  for  lower  values  of  N  and  for  the  concentrated  allocation  scheme.
Interestingly, varying the values of K,b  and m  does not significantly affect the market shares of
the  largest  participant. 22  Market  share  appears  to  be  determined  by  the  concentration  of  initial
endowments,  which  is  largely  determined  by  N  and  the  initial  allocation  scheme.  The  reported
market  shares  are  in  line  with  what  is  observed  in  many  SSSs  in  Europe,  where  often  a  few
participants generate the largest proportion of the business.
Table 1: Market share of largest participant on day D-2 (% of turnover)
N=5 N=15
Initial endowment
allocation scheme Diversified Concentrated  Diversified Concentrated
Average 0.20 0.25 0.07 0.11
Std.dev 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
Max 0.31 0.35 0.12 0.20
Min 0.11 0.15 0.03 0.04
Note: results reported for m = 0.5, b = 1, K = 30.
5.2.2  First day impact (D-Day)
The largest participant is assumed to default on all of its outstanding obligations on day D. Tables 2
and  3  illustrate  the  impact  on  settlement  efficiency  (total  settlement  efficiency q  and  indirect
settlement efficiency q
*) for differing values of N,b , m  and l  and for different initial allocation
schemes.23 Several observations can be made. First,q  and
* q  vary considerably across different
parameter combinations. The value of averageq  (total settlement efficiency) ranges from 32% to
83%,  while
* q   ranges  between  64%  and  96%.  Settlement  efficiency  also  varies  considerably
22  For very small values of K, increasing the number of securities does have a significant impact, causing
concentration  to  decline,  all else  equal.  However,  the  magnitude of  the  impact  decreses  as  the  initial
number of securities increases, so that increasing the number of securities beyond 30 has only a negligible
effect.
23 Note that it is not useful to report the other liquidity measure, market liquidity, for the first day of the crisis.
On day D, participants only stop trading with the defaulter. Hence, total trade volume is diminished by the
market share of the largest participant. Participants only restrict their trades with the other counterparties on
subsequent days, after observing q
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across simulations for a given combination of parameter values, as can be seen from the relatively
high standard deviations.
Table 2: Average value of settlement efficiency on day D as a function of credit limit and initial


























Concentrated 0 32.26 64.33 57.84 75.69
(10.82) (17.59) (8.99) (9.58)
0.5 43.49 86.71 72.27 94.89
(8.23) (6.84) (5.62) (2.58)
1 43.22 87.02 72.19 94.926
(8.21) (6.92) (5.95) (2.53)
Diversified 0 42.12 70.16 70.20 80.95
(10.58) (15.14) (7.34) (7.48)
0.5 53.96 89.87 83.95 96.99
(7.28) (5.56) (3.80) (1.74)
1 53.80 89.71 83.99 96.97
(7.44) (5.68) (3.72) (1.68)
Results reported for K=30, m = 0.5, b =0.2.
As expected, total settlement efficiency is low when the market share of the largest participant is
high (N=5 and concentrated allocation). Settlement efficiency (both direct and indirect) is positively
related to N, the number of participants. This can be explained by the fact that the higher is N, the
smaller the initial shock, as the market share of the largest participant is lower. In addition, higher
values of N imply that the shock will be distributed among more participants, thereby raising indirect
settlement efficiency.
Liquidity, in the form of credit, also appears to be an important tool in limiting contagion (a higherl
corresponds to a higher credit limit). Importantly, however, whereas increasingl from 0 to 0.5 has a
significant effect on settlement efficiency, further increasingl  from 0.5 to 1 appears to have no
additional  impact.  This  is possibly  because  even  generous  liquidity  provision  cannot  completely
eliminate settlement failures for participants who find themselves short in securities.
At first sight, the level of contagion - as measured by q
* -  may appear to be very limited once credit
is available. Indeed, in cases wherel ‡ 0.5,
* q  is always above 85% and even reaches 96% with
the diversified initial allocation scheme. However, these are average values across simulations, and
they reflect the first day on which contagion effects may occur. As will become clear below, the level
of disruption can be much higher in subsequent days.  Also, given the sizeable transaction volume
in  securities  markets,  these  figures  are  non-negligible.  For  example,  many  SSSs  settle  dailyNBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 24
transaction  volumes  of  more  than  100bn  EUR,  which  implies  that  a  drop  of  10%  in  settlement
efficiency represents 10bn EUR in trades.
Table 3 reveals that the degree of contagion on the first day of default can be significantly worse if
average turnover prior to default ( m ) is higher or if trading behavior is more extreme (lower b ).
Settlement efficiency (both q  and
* q )  is higher for higher b  (less extreme trades) and lower m .
When  participants  trade  more  at  the  boundaries  of  their  budget  constraints,  the  greater  is  the
likelihood that they will experience an unanticipated short position in cash or securities during a
crisis; hence, the likelihood of a settlement failure is increased. In addition, settlement efficiency
decreases  when  turnover  increases  (higher m).  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  chain  of  trades
becomes longer when turnover increases (i.e. the number of times a single security is traded during
a given trading day increases). This causes the contagion effects of a single settlement failure to
increase.  This  result  suggests  that  more  liquid  markets  may  actually  result  in  more  significant
contagion.
Table 3: Total settlement efficiency on day D as a function of turnover and trade behavior


































0.2 0 64.24 84.70 57.84 75.69 43.75 57.44
1 74.77 98.47 72.19 94.92 62.67 82.35
1 0 71.09 92.43 68.10 88.05 60.79 78.64
1 76.12 98.92 74.69 96.66 70.03 90.61
Results reported for N=15, K=30, concentrated allocation. Qualitative results are similar for diversified allocation and other values of
N and K.
5.2.3  Net buy vs. net sell position of the defaulter
Given the need for cash in every transaction, we expect there to be a relation between the net trade
position of the defaulter and settlement efficiency. The default of a net buyer extracts cash from the
system. As cash is used  in  every  transaction,  this  may lead  to  more significant contagion, and
hence lower settlement efficiency, than when the defaulter is a net seller.
Suppose that participanti is the defaulter. The measure for the net trade position of participant i
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Note that a negative value of T ijk represents a sale of security k by participant i to j. Similarly, a
positive value denotes a purchase of security k by participant i from j. Thus, a negative value for the
trade position signifies that participant i is a net seller and a positive value signifies that i is a net
buyer. For example, a value of 0.1 implies that participant i bought 10% more securities than it sold
and hence is accumulating securities in exchange for cash (net buyer).
Figure 1 (a, b, c, d) plots total and indirect settlement efficiency against the net trade position of the
defaulter on trades from day D-2. All of the graphs in this figure are generated from a scenario
where N=15, K=30, 5 . 0 = m  and b =0.2 and the concentrated initial allocation scheme. 24 Figures
1a and 1b illustrate the case where no credit is available (l =0). These figures illustrate that the net
trade position of the defaulter has an important impact on settlement efficiency. A net buy position
of  the  defaulter  has  a  more  significant  negative  impact  on  settlement  efficiency  than  a  net  sell
position, and in some cases the net buy position leads to a near complete breakdown of settlement.
As might be expected, the effect of the net buy position is stronger for the measure of indirect than
total settlement efficiency.
Figures 1c and 1d illustrate that once participants are able to draw on credit lines during settlement
(higher l ),  the  impact  of  net  trade  position  on  settlement  efficiency  disappears.  Importantly,
however, settlement failures still occur, despite generous liquidity provision. As already noted, this is
due to the fact that securities transactions contain a securities leg as well as a cash leg. Due to the
initial default, some securities remain with the defaulting participant, causing some participants to
be short in securities. Even unlimited credit cannot make up for these short positions.
24  Qualitative results are similar for other values of K N, , ,m b  and the diversified allocation scheme.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 26
Figure 1 (a, b, c, d): net trade position and settlement efficiency
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Note: N=15, K=30, 5 . 0 = m  and b =0.2. For illustrative purposes, only 300 random observations out of the 1000 simulations
are plotted.
5.2.4  Length of the crisis
We have argued above that while the impact of a disruption on the first day is important, it is also of
interest to know what happens in subsequent days. This is especially true if settlement efficiency is
used as a measure of liquidity risk in SSSs. For example, if a large proportion of the unsettled
trades resulting from the first day of a shock can be settled the next day, then replacement cost risk
and liquidity risk will be judged to be limited, as settlement will have only been delayed by one day.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 27
However, if settlement failures persist, uncertainty will remain and liquidity risk or replacement cost
risk may become significant.
Figure 2, which contrasts three scenarios, provides information regarding the length of the crisis.
The "Low settlement" scenario is one where no liquidity is available ( l = 0) and where participants
make no adjustments to their expected asset holdings to account for the indirect effects of default ( g
= 0). The "Intermediate settlement" scenario is one where liquidity is still unavailable but where
participants adjust their expected asset holdings to account for the indirect effects of default ( g = 1).
The  "High  settlement"  scenario  represents  one  where  liquidity  is  abundant  ( l  =  1)  but  where
participants  do  not  adjust  their  expected  asset  holdings.  (Results  for  this  scenario  are  not
significantly different if participants do adjust their expected holdings.) Values of other parameters
that are constant across all three scenarios are: N=15, K=30, 5 . 0 = m , b =1, and concentrated
initial allocation scheme.
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The top panel of Figure 2 presents settlement efficiency over a period of several days (from D-1 up
to D+10) for each of the three scenarios. Only total settlement efficiency is plotted, since from day
D+2 onwards there are no more trades involving the defaulted participant, and indirect settlement
efficiency becomes equivalent to total settlement efficiency. The lower panel of Figure 2 presents
the volume of credit extended, as well as the level of market liquidity. Results in this panel are
presented only for the intermediate and high scenarios, as no credit is available in the low scenario,
and there is also no fall in market liquidity, since participants do not adjust their expected holdings
of assets following default.
The  upper  panel  of  Figure  2  clearly  demonstrates  that  even  in  a  SSS  with  DVP  and  gross
settlement, there is still a possibility of a significant, multi-period disruption of settlement activity
when a large participant fails. This is the case even when the default is anticipated by the market
(as is the case in our simulations). In the Low scenario, settlement efficiency falls drastically and
does not improve throughout the ten-day period following default. This is due to the impact of the
initial  settlement  failures  and  the  absence  of  both  liquidity  and  adjustment  of  expected  asset
quantities. The more trades that fail to settle in this case, the greater the discrepancy between
participants'  actual  holdings  of  securities  and  cash  at  the  point  of  settlement  and  the  expected
budget constraints they used for determining the trades. Hence, the more trades that fail to settle,
the more likely it is that future trades will fail to settle (and settlement efficiency will fall), unless the
situation can be corrected for by liquidity provision.
This is in sharp contrast with the High scenario, where the drop in settlement efficiency is smaller at
the beginning of the crisis and the increase in efficiency is more dramatic. The rapid increase in
settlement efficiency in this scenario occurs as a result of ample liquidity provision by the SSS. In
the Intermediate scenario, settlement efficiency is identical to that for the Low scenario up to day
D+3, after which settlement efficiency improves as a result of participants' downward adjustment of
their expected budget constraints (in response to observed settlement inefficiency from the previous
day). This scenario illustrates that even in the absence of liquidity provision, settlement efficiency
can improve due to participants limiting their expected budget constraints and, consequently, the
volume of their trades.
In each of the three scenarios, settlement efficiency is lower on the day after the initial default than
on the day itself. This is because on day D+1 there is not only the direct impact of the default but
also  the  subsequent  indirect  effect  on  the  day  D-1  trades.  On  day  D+2  settlement  efficiency
improves  relative  to  D+1,  as  there  are  no  longer  any  unsettled  trades  involving  the  defaulting
participant; hence there are no longer any direct effects of the default.
The Intermediate scenario suggests that participants' adjustments of their expected asset holdings
and the resulting limitation of the volume of trades can serve as a partial substitute for liquidity
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expectations alone (e.g., g >> 1) could lead to settlement efficiency as high as that occurring in the
High scenario. This turns out not to be the case. When expectations are very conservative, trading
virtually halts. As a result, there are no new trades which, when settled, would then allow the trades
in the queue to settle. Hence, unsettled trades remain in the queue while trading volume is very low,
resulting in very low settlement efficiency.
An important observation arising from all three scenarios illustrated in the upper panel of Figure 2 is
that even with generous liquidity provision, settlement efficiency does not return to its "pre-stress
event" levels within 2 days of the crisis. Even if participants lower their expected holdings of assets
to account for contagion effects (as in the Intermediate scenario), it is still possible that,ex post, the
actual holdings of cash and securities after settlement will be lower than assumed, and that further
settlement failures will occur. This is indeed what happens in the simulations, especially when no
credit  is  available  ( l =0)  and,  by  definition,  when  participants  make  no  adjustments  to  their
expected asset holdings (the Low scenario).
Restoring  settlement efficiency through  either credit  provisioning  or conservative trading  volume
comes at a cost. This is illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 2, which presents the use of credit
and the evolution of market liquidity. The latter measure reveals that in the Intermediate scenario
(the only scenario in Figure 2 where participants adjust their expected budget constraints) average
trade volume falls to around 80% of the pre-default level on day D+1. In subsequent days, market
liquidity improves, although only slightly. In the High scenario, aggregate end of day credit usage -
as a percentage of outstanding securities -  peaks on day D+1 at around 50% of the aggregate
value of asset holdings, then diminishes as settlement efficiency restores. It nevertheless remains
at a level well above 10% in the subsequent days.
The fact that  liquidity  provision and  participants' expectations  are partial substitutes  in restoring
settlement efficiency suggests a trade-off from a financial stability perspective. Generous liquidity
provision places a heavy burden on the liquidity provider but does not reduce trading activity, while
conservative reactions by market participants avoid the burden on the liquidity provider but entail a
fall  in  trading  activity  (resulting  in  less  liquid  markets).  From  a  financial  stability  perspective  a
balance will need to be struck between the two. Also, the timing of the impact of the measures is
different.  Liquidity  provision  increases  settlement  efficiency  immediately,  while  participants'
reactions affect settlement efficiency only with a two-day lag.
The  above  discussion  has  suggested  that  liquidity  provision  by  the  SSS  (or  a  central  bank
supporting the  SSS)  is an  important  policy tool for improving settlement efficiency  in periods of
market  disruption.  Access  to  liquidity  in  times  of  stress  loosens  participants'  cash  constraints,
resulting in higher settlement efficiency. Unfortunately, however, this solution may not always be
possible, as generous liquidity provision may be judged by the SSS to be too costly or too risky.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 30
Even if the SSS is supported by a central bank, there may be limits on the amount of credit that the
central bank is willing to provide, as such an amount might have an impact on monetary policy
objectives.
6  CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND ONGOING RESEARCH
This paper has demonstrated that liquidity risk may be important in SSSs with gross settlement,
even  in  systems  with  delivery  versus  payment  and  generous  liquidity  provision.  Although  DVP
systems eliminate principal risk in SSSs, DVP does not eliminate replacement cost and liquidity risk.
Moreover, settlement disruptions may persist over a period of several days. The analysis uses a
multi-period model to analyze the extent and dynamics of settlement failures that may occur as a
result of the default of the largest participant. From a financial stability point of view, it is important to
understand  the  mechanics  of  breakdowns  in  settlement  efficiency,  the  factors  exacerbating
disruptions, and the policy tools that may help to resolve crises.
The results suggest that settlement failures due to the default of a large participant are higher in
SSSs with a limited number of participants  and a relatively high  volume of trading. The trading
behavior of participants also appears to be important. The more "extreme" are trades- in the sense
of  being  close  to  the  boundaries  of  participants'  expected  holdings  of  cash  or  securities -  the
greater the degree of settlement inefficiency induced by a default. Extremeness of trading behavior
can also be linked to the types of participants observed in practice. Participants with less extreme
trades may be thought of as those trading for their own accounts, mainly initiating a limited number
of transactions in buy and hold positions. Participants with more extreme trade behavior may be
thought of as broker/dealers, initiating many trades on behalf of their customers. In order to limit
costs,  these  participants  trade  at  the  limits  of  their  budget  constraints,  holding  relatively  small
amounts of surplus cash and securities in their own books.
The trading behavior of the defaulting participant can also have an important impact. A defaulter
who has a net  buy  position  will cause  more settlement failures  than  a  defaulter with  a net  sell
position, at least when little credit is available. The importance of the net trade position can be
explained  by  the  fact  that  cash  is  used  in  every  transaction,  while  a  security  is  only  used  for
transactions involving that security. When enough credit is provided by the SSS, the relative impact
of a defaulting institution's net trade position on settlement inefficiency disappears. In other words,
liquidity provision by the SSS can help participants to absorb the shock created by the default of a
participant, thereby reducing the negative impact of a net buy position of the defaulter relative to a
net sell position. This suggests that liquidity provision can be an important policy tool for central
banks in supporting the functioning of financial markets. However, injecting enough liquidity in the
system to prevent  severe  contagion  of  settlement failures  may  prove  to  be  quite costly or may
interfere  with  other  policy  objectives.  Moreover,  because  securities  transactions  involve  both  aNBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 31
securities and a cash leg, liquidity provision cannot completely eliminate settlement failures due to
major market disruptions.
Voluntary  limitations on  the  volume of  trades  by participants  may  act  as  a  partial substitute for
liquidity provision in alleviating settlement inefficiency due to a market disruption. That is, either
fairly conservative reactions by participants to the crisis or ample liquidity can improve settlement
efficiency.  However,  these  two  alternatives  may  lead  to  a  trade-off  from  a  financial  stability
perspective. Liquidity provision places a heavy burden on the liquidity provider but does not reduce
trading  activity,  whereas  conservative  reactions  by  market  participants  avoid  the  burden  on  the
liquidity provider but may result in less liquid markets.
One type of risk that the model of this paper does not consider and that is potentially important is a
fall in securities prices coming about if participants increase their sales of securities in an attempt to
raise  cash  for (future)  settlement of  trades  that did  not settle due  to  the  disruption. 25 As noted
earlier, such a fall  in asset  prices  would  translate  into  solvency risk for participants rather than
feeding back directly into the liquidity risk. Hence, in order to analyze the market risk arising from a
disruption in a SSS, it would be necessary to have a model with capital and solvency constraints for
participants, in addition to the "budget" constraints used for trading in the model of this paper. This
goes beyond the scope of the paper, given the complications that would be involved in conducting
our simulations with such an "enhanced" model and given our focus on liquidity risk. Hence, we are
unable to analyze policy questions related to the potential effects of market disruptions in SSSs on
securities prices and any resulting weakness in participants' balance sheets.
It might also be desirable in future work to allow for securities lending and borrowing programs. It
would be necessary, however, to ensure that the size of the securities lending pool is endogenously
determined, and to allow for changes in participants' willingness to lend securities during crises.
The  result  that  settlement  failures  can  be  severe  over  a  period  of  days  is  potentially  important
information for SSSs. This result suggests that assessments of liquidity risk that only focus on the
initial day of the disruption may significantly underestimate the total amount of settlement failures
and  the  ultimate  amount  of  liquidity  needed  to  guarantee  timely  settlement  in  case  the  largest
participant fails. One way to shorten the potential length of crises is to try to limit the lag between
trade and settlement. If technology could allow for real-time settlement, for example, participants
would not need to form expectations about their cash and security holdings. Although settlement
failures in response to a major disruption would still occur, multi-day contagion effects would no
longer arise.
25  Recall that a sale of a security would increase the cash available to the participant only in two-days'  time.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 72 - JULY 2005 32
7  APPENDIX
The beta distribution
The beta distribution describes a family of curves that are unique in that they are nonzero only on
the interval [-S,P]. The shape of the beta distribution is quite variable depending on the values of
the parameter b , as illustrated by the plot below. The constant pdf (the flat line) shows that the
standard  uniform  distribution  is  a  special  case  of  the  beta  distribution.  0< b <1  represents
participants with extreme trade behaviour as they frequently use the limits of the budget constraint.
b >1 represents participants with less extreme trade behaviour.
In the simulation, b <1, resembling broker/dealers  which only hold securities and cash on their
account for trading purpose. In order to minimise the costs for their clients, they try to use all their
margin.
Figure 3: PDF of the beta distribution
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